249: Plans and Preparations

Description

Italy invaded Greece on October 28, 1940, built on two catastrophically wrong assumptions: that the Greek army would not fight, and that the forces in Albania were ready for the task. The Metaxas dictatorship rejected the 3AM ultimatum without hesitation, and Greece mobilized almost overnight, with political divisions dissolving in the face of the invasion.

The Italian offensive stalled within days, badly mauled at the Battle of Kalpaki where Greek artillery shredded Italian tank attacks in a valley the Italians had to cross. By November 8 the entire Italian advance had been halted, and a sweeping reorganization of command and structure pointed to deeper problems that would only worsen as the campaign continued.

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Transcript

Hello everyone and welcome to History of the Second World War Episode 249 - Greece Pt. 1 - . This week a big thank you goes out to Ted for the donation and to Grant, Theodore, and Generalissimus Wallenstein, which is quite the Patreon account name, for supporting the podcast by becoming members. Members get access to ad-free versions of all of the podcast’s episodes plus special member only episodes roughly once a month. Head on over to historyofthesecondworldwar.com/members to find out more.

The story of the Second World War after the German attack on France is a story of the constant expansion of the fighting into new geographical areas and into new countries. We have tracked that expansion so far on the podcast over the last few months, first to North Africa and then into the Balkans and Yugoslavia. While the attack into Yugoslavia was being planned and would then occur, there was already a war happening in Greece, with the Italo-Greek War having started with an Italian invasion of Greece during the last months of 1940. For Italy, this would become the primary area of focus for the Italian Army, with far greater numbers of men and supplies being sent to Greece than to North Africa where the Italian Army was also fighting the British. At the exact time that Graziani was begging for every tank and soldier for his efforts in North Africa, five full divisions would instead be sent to Albania to prepare for operations in Greece. Mussolini and his advisors simply believed that the efforts against Greece were more important to the future of Italy, with Italian expansion into this region seen as a key war goal that the Italian leaders were keen to secure before any kind of peace should occur. The German leaders initially wanted nothing to do with fighting in Greece, they were already preparing for the invasion of the Soviet Union and believed that focus should be placed on those preparations. However, they would be pulled south not necessarily by Italian actions but instead British reactions. When Greece was attacked by the Italians, even though they did well, Churchill and the British leaders would offer assistance, under the belief that fighting the Italians in Greece would be a good way to distract them from North Africa and to protect a Balkan ally that could be a jumping off point for future operations. The idea of British forces in Greece was a concern due to the ability of British bombers, from airbases in the area, to reach the vital German oil supplies in Romania. This threat would cause escalation during the spring of 1941, with both German and British land forces being committed to action in Greece to help the Italians and the Greeks. This series will cover all of these events, both on the Greek mainland and on the island of Crete. But in some ways, even discussing the British and German involvement in the fighting is doing a disservice to the Italians and Greek armies that would begin the campaign by themselves. Perhaps the most important thing to say at the front of this series is to reiterate that the start of the invasion of the Greece had nothing to do with Germany or Britain, it was entirely an Italian operation. It was pursuing Italian war goals, with Italian forces, against a Greek enemy. Remembering that fact is key to ensuring that the events of the first period of the invasion do not get overshadowed by what would happen later. That is why we will spend the next two episodes focusing just on the period before the Germans become involved in the fighting on the ground. Then as first the British then the German forces become involved the story will broaden first out into the Mediterranean naval battles and then to Crete. In the end it would be another major setback for Britain, Greece, and their allies. Another failure, and for the Germans and Italians another great victory. It would also be the last time that the Italians and Germans would defeat another country in a military campaign, there would be other governments replaced, or countries occupied, but not in a traditional military campaign like what would be launched against Greece. With all of that said, lets get started by discussing of the events in Greece before the start of the war.

In 1936 Greece came under the control of a dictatorship led by Ioannis Metaxas, a Greek military officer and political leader who had been involved with Greek politics for many decades and also opposed the entry of Greece into the First World War. During the interwar period he would lead a conservative political party, participating in a few governments until 1935 when he was a key player in getting the former Greek King, George II put back on the throne through a plebiscite of questionable legitimacy. Metaxas was then allowed to establish a government, even though his political party was one of the smaller ones after the 1936 elections, mostly due to the support of the King. And he would remain in power until his death in 1941. Regardless of the political situation, relations with Britain remained strong which would be important during the war years, and in fact Metaxas was a strong supporter for some kind of alliance with Britain in the late 1930s. During that period the British leaders were not inclined towards such agreements, preferring the appeasement approach that had been seen as successful at Munich. Metaxas was concerned about future military actions though, and this prompted major investment into the Greek military starting in 1936. The challenging part was that Greece’s industrial base could not really support the creation of some of the more advanced types of military equipment seen at the time. This meant that most weapons had to be purchased abroad, which was difficult for the Greek treasury to handle, particularly at a time when Greece was already having issues with its economy due to changes in international trade. This would eventually allow for a military build up to five Army Corps, containing 15 infantry and one cavalry division plus some regiments of support units. This brought total strength up to around 250,000 men. Then when the Germans invaded Poland in September 1939 Greece would officially announce its neutrality as quickly as possible. However, the expectation was that this would probably just delay Greek entry, not prevent it, if the war spilled out beyond Poland which it seemed almost certain to do.

The relationship between Greece and Britain would be an important part of the story of Greece during the Second World War, but unlike during the First World War, where Britain and France had appeared to be quite strong when they requested Greece to join to start a second front in the Balkans, in 1940 the British were in a challenging position. After the Italian invasion of Albania in the spring of 1939, the first official guarantees were given to Greece, but they were very vague about what exactly the British promised the Greeks in case of an Italian invasion. Part of the reason for this was the fact that the British leaders simply did not know what they would have available at any given moment when the Italians invaded. Before the start of the war there were barely enough British forces in the theatre to defend British interests, let alone enough to send to Greece and it would be difficult to justify draining British strength from other areas just as tensions in Europe were reaching a fever pitch to then send to the Eastern Mediterranean. This entire situation of course only got worse after the start of the war, and particularly after the fall of France when British strength was stretched at its thinnest of the war. The British Army was still fighting in the deserts of North Africa, and the Royal Navy was still the Royal Navy, but other than those two facts the war had gone quite well for Italy and its German ally. This put the Greeks in an odd position where they wanted and needed British help, but the British were not necessarily in a good position to give it even if Churchill believed it was necessary.

But of course Greece was not the instigator of events in the region, that was instead Italy. Mussolini wanted to make sure that in the last part of 1940 the Italian Army was doing something to control more territory somewhere, the primary area of attack was originally in North Africa against the British in Egypt. However, when the initial Italian attacks were delayed by several months, and then only reached Sidi Barrani, barely across the border, Mussolini began to look closer to home for the next campaign of conquest. Having already invaded and taken control of Albania, the plan was to use it to stage an invasion of Greece, although Yugoslavia was briefly considered as the target. It was eventually rejected in part due to the economic relationship that Germany had with Yugoslavia, which was an important source of raw materials that were unavailable within Germany itself. After the disappointing delays in Egypt, more divisions of troops were sent to Albania to prepare for the Greek invasion. While the Greek adventure would not cause any economic issues for Germany, it was still generally against the advice of Germany with Hitler and the other German leaders believing that any war in the Balkans presenting risks for the upcoming Barbarossa offensive. This would not cause any kind of cancellation of the attack, just imposed some restrictions. The original date for the attack was in the first week of September, but as the date neared it was pushed back to October. A key to all of the planning and preparations was the general belief among the Italian leaders that the Greeks would not actually fight them, and in fact the Greek forces were more likely to refuse to fight and they would turn against their officers and join the Italians. During early October some of these delusions were destroyed due to a seeming stiffening of Greek resolve. There was also the ever present problem that any attack into Greece would simply be easier if the Italians first attacked into Yugoslavia because controlling southern Yugoslavia would almost double the frontage on which the Italians could attack. But Hitler was very clear that Yugoslavia was protected by its pro-German monarch, Prince Paul, and that it should not be touched. After the attack was again postponed to October 20th, a meeting on October 15th would be particularly important. On that day a council of war was held specifically to discuss the possibility of an attack on Greece. Mussolini had decided that an attack had to happen at the earliest possible moment. This action was prompted by the decision made in Germany to expand its control of Romania, and to place Luftwaffe forces in place to protect the vital Ploesti oil fields from any kind of British attack. The Romania fields provided crucial supplies of oil to the German war machine and had to be protected at any costs. This German move rankled Mussolini because it was not consulted, even though its interests clearly placed the entire Balkan area within its sphere of influence. Mussolini would then demand that the Italian army act fast, before Hitler could even voice a word of concern. The foreign minister Ciano promised to work on some kind of border incident that could be used to justify an invasion. On the military side Visconti Prasca, the commander of the forces in Albania, believed that the forces under his command could reach Athens in a week while Ciano thought that the Greeks would surrender the instant bombs were dropped on the capital. There were some in attendance who were far less convinced about the upcoming Italian operation, but none of them would speak out openly against it, with Mussolini making it clear that this was a time when no dissenting voices would sway him or the Italian army from the invasion.

To execute the attack the Italians had 9 divisions positioned within Albania, and these forces would be split into three different groups for the attack. Along the coast the Coastal Group would advance down the coast. In the middle a little over 2 divisions of forces would advance to the south while to the east another division would advance through the mountainous terrain in that area. Their exact destinations do not really matter, because they were never going to come close to them. Altogether this meant about 87,000 men would be advancing along a front of around 250 kilometers, most which was quite mountainous and difficult to move across. There were a few paths that they could take that were not as challenging, generally through a series of valleys, but the Greeks were well aware of the terrain and knew that those would be the most likely avenues for attack. This meant that they were able to position the roughly 50,000 men of the Greek 2nd Corps to meet the most likely Italian attacks, reducing the challenges often experienced by an outnumbered army. The Italians also knew that the Greeks knew where they would be attacking from, but their plan was based on two very poor assumptions. The first assumption I already mentioned, they believed that the Greek army would not fight, and if it did it would be ineffective and quick to give up ground. Based on this, the entire plan for the attack did not have to be perfect, it just had to happen and the Italians would be victorious. The second assumption was that the Italian forces were up for any kind of fighting, and were prepared to launch an attack at the scale being asked of them. There were 87,000 Italian soldiers available for the attack, and numbers do matter, but their units were not in a good position to attack. There was a serious lack of artillery, support units like hospital units, and the armor units that were available were not in great shape. For example, in the central thrust was a unit of over 150 light Fiat tanks, but many of them were barely running. These issues made the paper strength of the Italian forces, 9 divisions! a bit of a lie and that was not properly taken into account by the Italian leaders. Ciano was able to deliver on his promise of diplomatic events that could at least start to justify the Italian invasion. The events that were fabricated would occur in southern Albania. The first was a series of leaflets dropped by an airplane over Albania which told the Albanians to join the Greeks to fight the Italians. The aircraft was an Italian aircraft. The second were some bombs that would explode in Sarande near some official Italian buildings. The bombs were planted by the Italians. Finally, there was an announcement that a group of Greek soldiers had attacked Italian positions near the border. This attack did not occur. And so with the obvious, and completely fabricated, provocations out of the way the Italian leaders moved onto the next phase of their plan, the Ultimatum.

In the grand tradition of ultimatums the one that the Italians would send to the Greeks was designed to be rejected. It would be delivered to Metaxas at 3AM on October 28th. It began by stating that the Greeks had violated their declared neutrality due to their relations with the British, claiming that the Greeks had allowed Royal Navy vessels to stay in port for too long and to use Greek facilities to resupply. The core of the ultimatum was the demands that the Italians were making which stated that as a guarantee of neutrality by Greece and of the security of Italy, the Italian government requests the facility of occupying, with its armed forces and for the duration of the conflict with Great Britain, some strategic points in Greek territory. As with many such ultimatums this clause was designed to cause it to be rejected, because allowing the military forces of a possible enemy to enter into the country and occupy various areas was essentially surrendering. As the story goes, after Metaxas finished reading the note that had been given to him he would reply that the Greek government rejected the terms and that “well then, it’s war”. After the rejection there were a few hours to go before the Italian forces would attack, with the ultimatum not being set to expire until 6AM. Metaxas and the other Greek leaders would not simply wait around for the next few hours though. Metaxas’ first call was to the King, of course, and then ministers started to be informed that they had to get to an emergency cabinet meeting as quickly as possible. While they were assembling Metaxas would head directly to the British ambassador to ensure that the British leaders were notified as quickly as possible about what was happening. He would also send a personal message to Churchill, “The war we confront today is thus solely a war for honour. The outcome of the world war will not be decided in the Balkans”. In the message he also made it clear that the Greeks would fight regardless of what the British did, but any help that they could provide would be invaluable not just from a military perspective but also to help boost morale. After his trip to the British ambassador Metaxas would meet with the King and Crown Prince before the cabinet meeting started at 5:30AM. During the meeting they would sign the general mobilization order, and they would be as prepared as possible for war. As news spread around Greece about what was happening the responses were rapid. Among the reservists who would be called up by the mobilization order, well many times they did not even wait for the notices to arrive and instead they would just begin reporting to their assigned muster points. Obviously the Italians had been wrong about the willingness of the Greeks to fight. The second interesting thing that happened is that almost overnight all of the political divisions in Greece had been healed, and while the day before there were Greek political leaders that spoke out strongly against the Metaxas dictatorship, as soon as the Italians were on the doorstep those differences were forgotten. There were even some opposition leaders, who had literally been put in jail for speaking out against the dictatorship, that would request that they be released from prison so that they could join the war effort. Looking into the future for Greece, these feelings of unity would not remain during the late and post war period, for a few months of 1940 and 1941 the Italians had done what no Greek politician had been able to do for a very long time: unite Greece behind a single purpose.

While all of Greece was uniting against the Italian invasion, at the front when the attack began at 5:30AM, they did not go as well as the Italian leaders had hoped. The first problem was that the days before October 28th had been filled with rain along much of the attack front, which in many places meant that instead of nice dusty mountain paths, they were a muddy quagmire. But at least at the very start of the attack things went well, because the Greek forces, commanded by General Papagos, had been planning to retreat back from the border to more defensible positions to their rear. This meant that throughout the first day of the attack there was not a ton of actual fighting, as the Greek forces retreated and the Italians moved forward. Every day was crucial though, because immediately when the Italian attack started Papagos had started transferring troops from the Bulgarian border to bolster his forces that were facing the Italians. Bad weather continued on the second day, with the added issue that the rain was so heavy that it was causing all of the waterways in the region to become swollen, making crossing them difficult. The weather system was also broad enough that it would impact the shipment of supplies from Italy. It would not be until November 2, 4 days after the start of the invasion, that the first major encounter would occur between Greek and Italian troops, about 30 kilometers inside of Greek territory at Kalpaki. Kalpaki was in valley along a major road on the way to the first real Italian objective of Ioannina. It was important territory and the local Greek commander knew it, and so over the previous days the Greek units of the 8th division had been digging defenses in preparation for the Italian attack. The presence of Greek forces at Kalpaki was not a surprise, and so the Italians would attempt to soften them up with first a series of air attacks which would begin around 9 o’clock in the morning on November 2nd. Then a few hours later the Italian artillery would be in position to join in the bombardment. Then finally at 4PM the Italian tanks began their attack with 50 of the Italian light tanks moving into position and then starting forward. The results were less than impressive, because almost immediately when they came within range the Greek artillery began disabling tanks. To quote a radio transmission from one of the Italian officers: “I am being hit on all sides by heavy enemy small and medium-calibre artillery fire … This artillery fire is devastatingly accurate”. Even the tanks that did reach the first Greek positions were at times disabled by things as simple as blankets getting bound up in their tracks. Over the next several days the Italians would continue to attack, with very little gained except for more casualties. On the 8th of November, the Italians would pull back from their attack, and the entire Italian offensive would be halted.

While it could be easy to blame the weather for the failure of the initial Italian attacks, and the weather certainly hampered operations, it was far from the only reason that the attack stalled so quickly after it crossed the Greek border. At the simplest level the Italian attack was simply not well organized or well planned for. It was not designed in expectation of strong resistance, and the Italian forces were spread too thin, and had too little air and artillery support to have any real hope of breaking the Greek line. The best example of this was the fact that there was not a telephone line that connected the primary Italian Army and Air Force command posts, which meant that all discussions of air support had to be carried between the two by an officer in a small aircraft. Once the initial attacks had stalled, and that information made its way back to Rome, orders were sent out to massively reorganize the entire Army. These orders apparently originated with Mussolini himself, with the goal of taking the divisions that were in place and forming them into four corps which would then be used for further attacks. There was also a new representative of the Italian General Staff that was sent to Greece to oversee the reorganization, General Soddu. He was the Deputy Chief of the General Staff and the Undersecretary of War, so he certainly was well informed of the events that had occurred. He would then be put in command, replacing General Prasca. Who would be retired from active service at the end of November. Soddu would then be in command of the next phase of the operation, which will be covered next episode. But I don’t think it would surprise any listener to learn that when an offensive starts, achieves nothing, the commander is replaced and the entire unit organization structure is replaced…well….it was not a recipe for success.