214: An Easy Way Out

Description

Listen

Transcript

Summary

In this episode, we delve into the critical period leading up to the Battle of Britain, exploring the growing tensions between Britain, France, and Germany as Churchill and Halifax worked tirelessly to find a path forward. The discussion centers around the hesitant attempts at negotiations with Mussolini and the Italian government, alongside the strategic planning for a continued fight against Germany, ultimately leading to a pivotal decision that shaped the course of the war. Listen to discover the challenges and uncertainties faced by the British government as they prepared for the monumental battle ahead. Hello everyone and welcome to History of the Second World War Episode 214 - The Battle Before Britain Part 6 - An Easy Out. This week a big thank you goes out to Emily, Jack, and Jihu for supporting the podcast by becoming members. Members get access to ad-free versions of all of the podcast’s episode plus special member only episodes roughly once a month. Head on over to historyofthesecondworldwar.com/members to find out more. When Churchill became the Prime Minister in May 1940, while the situation in France did not seem to be going in a positive direction, it soon was getting much worse.As discussed during the invasion of France episodes French resistance began to fall apart in June but even before that time there were already discussions happening among some members of the British government about the possibility of seeking an early exit to the war.These discussions primarily revolved around working with Mussolini and the Italian government to arrange for discussions to take place between Britain, France, and Germany.Looking back from today, and with knowledge of the outcome of the war, the decision of the British government to continue fighting seems like the right move.But at the time, when Churchill and Halifax were working to make their decisions it was far from a sure thing that Britain would come out the other side of the war as anything other than yet another conquered territory.This episode will discuss the push towards, and then the rejection, of negotiations before looking at what precisely the British were planning to do if they did continue to fight Germany without any major continental allies.

In his position as Foreign Secretary Halifax would be the primary driver behind the possibility of a negotiated peace in May and June 1940.But before getting into those actions, it should be made clear that he was far from the only person who supported a peaceful exit from the war.For generations the goal of the British government had been to try and maintain a balance on the continent, to use its financial and military support to prevent one nation from gaining hegemony over Europe.And it appeared that in the summer of 1940, for the second time, that policy had failed with Hitler seeming to be the new Napoleon.With no major continental allies, what were the British to do? Yes the Royal Navy still existed, and the Royal Air Force still had planes in the air, but the Army had just been nearly destroyed on the continent.The men had been rescued from the beaches of Dunkirk but they had no equipment, barely any weapons.For many, particularly many of those in the Conservative Party which supported Halifax, negotiations did not seem like surrender, but instead just a realistic read in the situation in which Britain found itself in at the time.Britain was not in a strong position to negotiate, but there was a real possibility that it would be even worse once the Luftwaffe had started bombing British factories.For Halifax and his supporters, this might be the last chance for Britain to actually negotiate because they still had some military power with which to threaten Germany.On May 26th Halifax would bring up the topic of approaching Italy during a meeting of the War Cabinet, with the belief that Mussolini could ‘persuade Herr Hitler to take a more reasonable attitude’.Halifax was also able to tell the War Cabinet that he had already had some discussions with the Italian Ambassador who had been proactive in suggesting that Mussolini would be more than willing to play the role of arbiter.It is important to note that during these conversations, Italy was still neutral, and they would not enter the war until June 10th.This set off three very tense days of discussions among the War Cabinet, which often feature in just about every popular media portrayal of this time period.Halifax would also be able to use the French as part of his argument, stating that the French were also willing to approach Italy jointly with the British.Churchill firmly believed that any agreement with Hitler could not be trusted, and it is difficult to throw criticism at him for that mindset .Hitler had already broken multiple agreements with governments in Europe, and this would just be another for the pile.At the same time Churchill was very bad at articulating what is actual plan was, if he had one, beyond just the idea that continuing to resist was the right move.Halifax, supported by Chamberlain, believed that at the very least a conversation about what the terms might be was a conversation that the British leaders were duty bound to have given their current situation.But Churchill did not even want to ask for terms, although he did make it clear that he would be willing to listen to German terms if they were presented.However, even if he made that concession he also placed a caveat that he would insist that Germany give up the territory that it had taken over during the war, which would have immediately ended any actual negotiations between the two countries.Throughout much of May 27th and 28th no decision was made on the topic as Halifax looked for a way to persuade or force Churchill to move forward with the idea.Meanwhile, Churchill was looking for a way out, which resulted in a meeting being called with a wider group of ministers.At the meeting Churchill was in his element, being able to use his oratory skills to put forward the case for resistance.This would include the line: “I am convinced that every man of you would rise up and tear me down from my place if I were for one moment to contemplate parley and surrender. If this long island history of ours is to end at last, let it end only when each one of us lies choking in his own blood upon the ground.".After receiving support from the wider group of ministers, Churchill would finally completely reject Halifax’s initiative to open negotiations with Germany through Italy.While arguments would continue on May 28th, it was clear that Churchill’s mind was decided and that enough of the War Cabinet would support him to force an end to the debate.On that same day Churchill would send a clear signal to the Commons of the government’s intention to carry on the fighting, ending a report on the war situation with: “Meanwhile, the House should prepare itself for hard and heavy tidings. I have only to add that nothing which may happen in this battle can in any way relieve us of our duty to defend the world cause to which we have vowed ourselves; nor should it destroy our confidence in our power to make our way, as on former occasions in our history, through disaster and through grief to the ultimate defeat of our enemies.”.

This moment, of Churchill’s push back against the idea of a negotiated peace is seen as a major moment in the overall course of the war.And it was cemented as such by the events of the Battle of Britain when Churchill’s obstinacy would lead to a clear victory over the German attack.But there are two important questions to ask, was it likely that Britain and Germany actually would have come to some kind of peace agreement and was Churchill correct in his evaluations for why the British government should not enter into negotiations.For this section of his episode, a shoutout should be given to Allan Allport and his book Britain at Bay, which is definitely worth a read if you are interested in the path of Britain up to the Battle of Britain.Hopefully you will be hearing an interview from him in a few months on the sequel, but in Britain at Bay he dedicates and entire section to answering the question of whether or not the possible negotiations would have actually went anywhere.Allport would open the section like this: “How close did Britain really come to making peace with Hitler in May 1940? And to what extent was Churchill’s personal intervention in the matter critical? It’s arguable that far too much is made of these secret talks-about-talks. Halifax’s proposal never stood any real chance of gaining acceptance. The two Labour members of the War Cabinet, Attlee and Greenwood, said little throughout the three days of debate. But they were clearly unimpressed with what the foreign secretary was advocating. They never showed much likelihood of agreeing to his plan.".Even the one member of the War Cabinet that was most likely to support the talks, Chamberlain, was waining in his support for the idea by the time that discussions on the matter really kicked off on May 26th.In retrospect, and at the time, Halifax would make it clear that he was not trying to get to peace at any price, he was not advocating for surrendering to the Germans.And evne he would admit that it was unlikely that peace negotiations would have actually resulted in peace.Instead Halifax believed that it was likely that Germany would ask for something that the British government could not give, particularly something that would cause Imperial issues.Allport takes major issue with how Halifax is usually portrayed during these events, as some kind of coward or defeatist, and he is probably right here.Halifax at this point was a man who believed that it was his duty as a representative of the nation to investigate any possibility of ending the violence and avert the possibility of greater suffering.It was a noble goal, but one that was fraught with risk, not of military defeat but of political defeat and societal upheaval.Just as importantly, just because Britain would do relatively well in the months that followed these discussions does not mean that Churchill was completely right to advocate for continued resistance.One of main themes of some of the podcast’s episode have been trying to judge decisions based not on their outcomes but why they were made.And in this case, the why’s for Churchill’s decisions were really really bad.First up was one of the major reasons that the British and French had pursued their very passive policy that Germany was close to economic collapse.This idea that Germany was one swift nudge away from economic ruin was both a pillar of British war strategy for the first two years of the war and utterly, and absurdly, wrong.Instead of growing economically weaker, Germany was in a much stronger position in mid 1940 than they had been a year earlier.With the new territory under its control the access that the German economy had to raw materials, manpower, and manufactured goods had only increased.And yet the idea that further resistance would cause it to topple persisted in Churchill’s mind, and he was not the only one.The other reason that Churchill believed the best path was to continue to resist was his belief that the United States was close to coming into the war.Again, way off.The story of the actions of Roosevelt and the American government between the start of the war and December 1941 is a complicated one, and we will get there.But there was no clear path for America to enter the war during the Battle of Britain, and in fact there were many more reasons why it was clear that it would not enter the war.So, while Churchill’s decision made have had a good outcome, it was certainly not made for good reasons.

While the prospect of an American entry into the war was remote in the summer of 1940, that did not mean that the Yanks were completely uninvolved in what was happening.As you might expect right from the start of the war Roosevelt had been working to try and use American influence to bring the belligerent nations to the negotiating table.The British and French readily agreed to the idea, but of course the German leaders were far less interested.American manufacturing was also an important avenue that the Allied governments wanted to exploit to make up for the German material advantage in the early war years.Both Britain and France had placed large orders for aircraft and other equipment with American armament firms even before the war started, and then when France exited the war the British would take over many of those contracts.This was all very expensive though, and while Britain had solid gold and currency reserves that it had built up over the years, those reserves were not infinite.While the British Empire had been able to bank roll the Allied war efforts for most of World War 1, the situation in 1940 was far different and easily convertible currency was going to run out quickly.Losing access to American manufacturers due to lack of payment would have been disastrous for the British war effort, because it was largely thanks to those manufacturers that Britains’ rearmament and military expansion was able to accelerate so quickly.The summer of 1940 would also see the American government investing in military expansion in ways that it had not done since 1917.On May 16th, in response to the German invasion of France, and concerns about what the American military would be called upon to do in the future Roosevelt had introduced a massive armament plan before congress, including a plan designed to ramp up American aircraft production to 50,000 aircraft a year, an amount that they would almost double in 1944.This first massive bill was then followed by the even larger Two Oceans Navy Expansion Act, which you could make an argument is the moment that the Americans won the battle in the Pacific.With the goal of constructing 18 aircraft carriers, 7 battleships, and hordes of smaller and support ships, the one and a half year lead time between the passage of the act and the start of the Pacific war gave the United States navy a real headstart on creating the fleet that would eventually defeat Japan.All of these actions were viewed with a mixture of hope and concern in London.On the one hand, Britain and America did have a very good relationship, and America entering the war at some point was the most likely outcome.But at the same time, large American orders caused concern that British orders with American firms would be sidelined or slowed.The payment problem was also a looming concern, with the ever present fear that when the British government ran out of money, even if the American government stepped in to help the price would be very high.So while America would be an important side character in the story, it was clear that the nation across the Atlantic would not enter the war soon, which left the British leaders with one very thorny question.Even if they were going to refuse to negotiate, refuse to surrender, and keep fighting, what exactly did that mean, what exactly did they hope to do.

If two of the things that Churchill believed would lead to Germany’s downfall were not correct, in terms of economic fragility and American intervention, was there anything that would cause British leaders to believe that victory was possible?.The answer was, absolutely, with three specific categories of British advantages making continued resistance far from hopeless: the potential to utilize the economic resources of the entire world, the rapidly increasing levels of armament production in British factories, and the ever present Royal Navy.When it came to economic resources, the British government could conceivably get almost any possible good from around the world in trade.Britain also found itself in an interesting position when it came to importing goods during this period.For centuries at this point the British Empire had been making economic agreements around the globe, and it had a great reputation which meant that it could generally make agreements based on credit, easing the strain on British gold and currency reserves.Also, there were simply fewer customers around the world for a lot of the goods being sold, particularly after the German expansion of 1940.The British blockade of German and German controlled shipping meant that the world markets had lost many customers in Europe, and this made it easier to transition trade in the way that London wanted.The Germans were continuing to make efforts to hinder that trade through both U-boats and surface raiders, the Kriegsmarine would never come even close to achieving its goal of blocking enough trade to knock Britain out of the war.There are also some details of British trade during this period that can be easy for forget, given the developments of the decades that followed.One of these was that while Britain imported many goods, it was far from totally reliant on imports for everything, and in fact before the war Britain was the world’s leading exporter of coal which at the time was far and away the most important source of energy even if oil was catching up.What Britain did need to important was bulk commodities, timber, cotton, wool, oil, and of course food but at least they could call upon the world’s largest merchant fleet which had been built almost entirely in British shipyards over the years.They would then also add the merchant fleets of many of the conquered nations of Europe to that total through agreements with governments in exile that would generally find their way to London.While imports into the British Isles would at times not meet expectations due to the German actions, that was mostly due to the voracious appetite of British industry which by the middle of 1940 had shifted into an entirely different level of output.A full accounting of the growth and capacities of British armament production during this period is outside the scope of these episodes, but just looking at aircraft production in some way tells the tale of the Battle of Britain even without ever taking our story to the skies.Since the beginning of the war in September 1939 British production had been increasing, as it ramped up to fulfill its role in the Long War strategy that had been put in place by both British and French governments .Even before the German invasion into the West combined British and French production had started to outstrip that of Germany, and by the height of the Battle of Britain the RAF alone would be outpacing the Germans in some aircraft types like fighters.This would not be easy though, and by the summer of 1940 aircraft factories were in operation almost continuously, with many workers in the larger factories averaging in the mid-60s for hours worked.And often there were multiple shifts of workers all averaging those hours.This had required a reworking of the structures that had formed around British industrial workers over the preceding decades, with skilled workers and worker rights having to be altered to meet the demands of the war.Labor disputed did also happen, and there were strikes, even more of them in 1940 than in 1939, but they were often shorter in the second year of the war, resolved faster due to the sense of urgency from both sides.There would also be a mindset shift among many factory workers during this period, with many of the major manufacturing centers being key targets for German air raids.This connected the workers in the factories to the overall war far more than in any other conflict up to this point in history.Most importantly to the overall Battle of Britain all of this allowed British workers to produce more fighters than were being lost in the fighting, with 915 fighters lost from June to October, but just over 2,000 being built.

While the RAF was expanding thanks to the hard working factory workers of Britain, the Royal Navy was doing the same, and it was starting from a much greater position of strength.A few months ago on the podcast feed I released the episodes of the podcast covering the evolution of the Interwar Royal Navy with the most important fact being that in 1940 the Royal Navy was the most powerful navy in the world.It had more aircraft carriers, more cruisers, and a greater ability to actually stage operations that anybody else, including Japan and the United States.This provided critical protection for British trade around the world, although there would be multiple instances of German attacks .Importantly for the confidence in resistance in London, the Royal Navy was still an institution and a source of British strength, and that was also its reputation around the world.And honestly, that faith was not misplaced, because in the 18 months that followed, between the surrender of France and the entry of the United States into the war the Royal Navy would prove itself able to meet the trials it would find itself in.It was never going to be perfect, there would be mistakes and losses, but it would still be able to get the job done.

If the situation was not hopeless, and if there were some sources of strength and causes for at least some optimism that resistance could be maintained, what exactly did the Churchill and the British leaders plan to do after they made their decision to not enter into negotiations with Germany.The first problem that would have to be solved, and what a considerable portion of the following months of episodes will cover in detail, was the need to find a way to prevent a German invasion.For this they could take heart in the power of the Royal Navy and Royal Air Force, and it is has even been argued that during this period the British government, from Churchill on down did not actually believe an invasion was ever going to happen.However, building up the possible threat allowed for a much greater mobilization of society towards the purpose of winning the war.Others have argued that this paints the British leaders as far more confident than they actually were.It is something that we will probably never have a complete picture on, as many of the leaders did not leave behind the kind of unfiltered accounts that would be required to fully understand their inner thoughts.Beyond just surviving the oncoming attack, there was a recognition that the British army was broken and would take years to properly rebuild to a point where it could once again enter into the war on the continent.In the interim, faith was placed in the powers of RAF Bomber Command to prosecute its bombing campaign on Germany in a way that would slowly destroy the German ability to fight.Unfortunately for the overall course of the British war effort, and the airmen of Bomber Command, the expectations in the powers of a bombing campaign at this point in the war were horribly inflated.The British did not know it, but their bombing raids were doing almost nothing to hinder the German war machine in 1940 and it would continue on that path for years as its strength grew and its ability to actually hit things with bombs greatly increased.So in summary, in May 1940 all efforts were focused on preventing a German invasion and then using the power of RAF Bomber Command as the offensive arm of the British military.The situation would change once Italy entered the war in June, forcing more and more resources to be redirected towards the Mediterranean and Egypt.But those priorities, would remain for more than a year as perhaps not a path to victory for Britain but a path to continued resistance in the hopes that the situation would turn around at some point in the future.In June 1940 the horizon did not extend that far in the future though, disaster in France and the looming threat of direct German attacks forced far more focus simply on what was going to happen tomorrow, next week, next month.