224: Home Guard and the Airborne Panic

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This episode of History of the Second World War dives into the critical preparations Britain undertook ahead of the potential German invasion during the Battle of Britain, focusing on the overlooked yet vital role of the Home Guard and the widespread panic surrounding airborne attacks. Discover how civilian volunteers were mobilized, the strategic fears that shaped wartime decisions, and the human stories behind the historical events. Perfect for history enthusiasts eager to uncover the lesser-known tensions and resilience of Britain’s wartime efforts. Join the members’ community for ad-free episodes and exclusive content today!

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Hello everyone and welcome to History of the Second World War Episode 224 - The Battle About Britain Pt. 8 - Home Guard and the Airborne Panic. This week a big thank you goes out to Henk and Christopher for supporting the podcast by becoming members. Members get access to ad-free versions of all of the podcast’s episode plus special member only episodes roughly once a month. Head on over to historyofthesecondworldwar.com/members to find out more. Last episode looked at some of the planning and preparations being done in Britain to prepare for a possible German invasion. One of the major concerns shared by British leaders was the fear of a German airborne invasion. These fears would have an important impact on the structure of British preparations. This would include the emphasis placed in the early May and June on the Home Guard, that much ridiculed body of civilian volunteers who would organize all over Britain during the summer of 1940 with the goal of, well, that would depend on who you asked. While the Home Guard was being organized, for the British Army the focus was still on preparing military units to face an invasion, and a critical part of those preparations were the mobile units that would be called upon to met any German landings, to contain them, and then destroy them. All of these preparations meant that between May and September the overall British ability to meet an invasion drastically increased, and the timing could not have been better.

Home Forces Operation Instructions 3, published on June 25, would contain some of the reasoning behind these stop lines: “The general plan of defence is a combination of mobile columns and static defence by means of strong-points and stops. As static defence only provides limited protection of the most vulnerable points, it must be supplemented by the action of mobile columns. However mobile such columns may be, they cannot be expected to operate immediately over the whole area in which it is possible for the enemy to attempt invasion by sea or air.”. The ending bit there is quite important, the “or air” had important ramifications for the entire structure of British defenses. During the invasion of Belgium and the Netherlands German airborne forces had featured prominently, and the British were quite concerned that similar operations would be launched in conjunction with a seaborne invasion. Even before the German operations against Western Europe the Commander of Home Force, General Kirke, had been planning British defenses under the belief that the very first thing that the Germans would do was drop airborne troops onto a port where they could then land further reinforcements. These fears had just been reinforced by the actions of May 1940, particularly the airborne attacks against Fort Eben Emael in Belgium. But landings near the coast were only one part of the problem, and concerns were also raised about the possibility of the Germans landing forces far back from the coasts, deep into the English countryside. This had the effect of spreading out the British defenses far more than they otherwise would have. The results of these fears were the detailing of units from the coastal defense divisions to guard locations like airfields just to reduce the risk of losing those areas to a German air attack. Time and effort would also be spent on fixed fortifications like obstructing rivers and lakes to prevent seaplanes from landing and then laying obstructions in open fields in southern England to make them unsuitable for glider landings. Fears of airborne operations had an impact far beyond just troops positioning, and would have wider ramifications throughout British society. The most important reason for this was the belief that not only would the Germans drop airborne troops, but also parties of saboteurs dressed as civilians. Those groups might then meet up with people in Britain sho supported the German cause with the result being chaos. The Germans even stoked these fears directly by having radio broadcasts which seemed to be sending messages to those fifth columnists throughout Britain in preparation for the invasion. In mid-August they would even drop empty parachutes in parts of the Midlands, just to make it seem like those kinds of operations were happening. One of the challenges when it came to airborne operations was the difficulty it would be to stop them from happening. If the Germans dropped airborne troops, it was likely that they would be somewhat close to the coast, and this presented a time and distance problem for the RAF. The Ju-52 transports that the German units would use would probably only arrive in small groups and their goal would not be to penetrate British airspace to reach a distant target but instead to get to their drop zones as quickly as possible and then leave. This meant that they might only be over the course, with some likely drop zones resulting in just 5 minutes of time over British territory. Such operations would already be difficult to intercept, but they would also be coming in quite low, under 1,000 feet or 300 meters, which meant the formations would be discovered too late for interception, just due to the curvature of the earth. These issues just made it clear that if the Germans wanted to launch an airborne operation, there was little that the RAF could do to prevent it from happening. The reality of the German airborne preparations was quite different. Due to the attrition suffered during the operations over Norway, and then in the West, the scope of effort for the German airborne forces over Britain was quite limited. There were some plans to drop units first behind Dover, but these plans were changed due to obstructions that the British had placed in the landing areas, and instead the drops would happen northwest of Folkestone. This is the only direct plans that have survived, and they were quite small, with the commander of the German Airborne forces, General Student, claiming that if he had more troops he would have advocated for attacks on airfields, but the forces simply were not available for those bolder operations.

Fears of a German airborne operation would be one of the stated reasons behind the creation of what would first be called Local Defence Volunteers, later to be renamed the Home Guard. On May 14th Anthony Eden, the Secretary for the State of War, would announce the creation of the Local Defence Volunteers with an appeal for volunteers to fill out its ranks. In this appeal Eden outlined the risks of a major German airborne drop, saying that it would rely on speed to capture key points throughout Britain, and that the best way to defend against such an attack would be for a widespread and local militia to be ready to act at a moments notice. The appeal would continue: “However, in order to leave nothing to chance and to supplement, from sources as yet untapped, the means of defence already arranged, we are going to ask you to help us, in a manner which I know will be welcome to thousands of you. Since the war began the Government have received countless enquiries from all over the Kingdom from men of all ages who are for one reason or another not at present engaged in military service, and who wish to do something for the defence of the country. Now is your opportunity. We want large numbers of such men in Great Britain who are British subjects, between the ages of 17 and 65, to come forward now and offer their service in order to make assurance doubly sure. The name of the new force which is now to be raised will be the ‘Local Defence Volunteers’. This name, Local Defence Volunteers, describes its duties in three words. It must be understood that this is, so to speak, a spare-time job, so there will be no need for any volunteer to abandon his present occupation.”. While the reasons provided were largely military in nature, there would also be another important reason for the creation of the LDV, civilian morale. The hope was that by giving individuals who were so inclined to contribute what felt like in a meaningful way to the war effort support for that war would continue. This appeared to be somewhat successful, although there would be others who believed that having to rely on a new, unorganized, civilian militia just showcased the military weakness of the nation. But as soon as the appeal went out, regardless of any possible criticism, there was major support for the LDV. It would take just 24 hours for a quarter of a million men to volunteer for the LDV, two weeks later it would be 300,000, by the end of June 1.5 million. They would form ad hoc units all over Britain, from the largest cities to the smallest villages, there would even be units formed out of specific factories or organizations. One example would be the Post Office. During the 1940s the British Post Offices delivered the mail, but just as importantly they ran local telephone exchanges, exactly the kind of thing that the Germans would want to capture or destroy during an invasion. The workers at the Post Office would also volunteer in large numbers, and it was decided that there would be special Post Office units of the LDV created, which were largely staffed by Post Office workers and were given the explicit tasks of protecting the Post Office buildings. It did not take long for things to start off for the LDV, with some of the first patrols occurring just 3 days after its creation. While the War Office had initially supported the creation of the LDV, and they did feel that they were useful, they were also expecting only a few hundred thousand men to volunteer. When that number was surpassed in just a few weeks, it became a problem. Within the LDV there was no formal rank structure, which was demanded by the War Office due to the fact that they refused to place any military assets under the command of untrained civilians. There also was no real plan for how to organize units, train them, and ensure they were doing what they were supposed to do. This meant that local LDV units were almost universally led by just local leaders, business men, land owners, and others who naturally occupied a position of leadership within the community. They would organize the men, do a bit of marching and patrolling, but what they often did not do was any shooting. Rifles were a serious problem in Britain in the summer of 1940, because everybody wanted them and there were not enough of them to go around. Military rifle production had been spun down after the end of the First World War, with the British Army mostly pulling from First World War stockpiles during the interwar years. And then here there were large numbers of volunteers who thought that they were going to need a rifle, but there were also many actual military units that were short on rifles, particularly those being reconstituted from evacuees from the continent or new formations set up in the spring and summer of 1940. They took priority over the LDV units. Along with the LDV, over 400,000 men had joined the actual armed forces from April to June and they needed the same equipment that the LDV men were asking for. The lack of equipment was just one of many problems for the LDV over the following months, as it rapidly became clear to many local LDV units that how they viewed their LDV service and what their expectations were varied greatly from those within the government and particularly the War Office. The War Office just wanted the LDV units to be passive assistance to their efforts, mostly as a way of gathering information and then doing non-combatant tasks that would always be needed. The LDV, by and large, saw themselves as a militia force capable of proactive action. If a German attack started they wanted to be out there hunting for parachutists, harassing German units, and doing other activities that they felt were more direct benefit to the defense of the nation. This difference in opinion would cause major issues for the LDV during the summer months until its role was clarified in August when it was announced that the explicit goal of the LDV in the case of an invasion was to slow and obstruct German forces by any means necessary. By that time the equipment situation had completely shifted, and mostly thanks to the arrival of hundreds of thousands of American M1917 Enfield rifles along with large numbers of other rifles, the LDV units were far better equipped to do the thing that they wanted to do. The LDV and the Home Guard would end up being something of a punchline in later decades, thanks mostly to the popularity of Dad’s Army, and British comedic sitcom, which released its first episodes in 1968. But in the panicked days of mid-May 1940 it was seen as a real solution to the real problem of not having enough men to fight off a German invasion. The challenges only started when that acute need changed during the summer months, and then the British government and military suddenly had this massive force of vocal volunteers that did not really fit within their military plans. This was because the entire evolution of the British Army during the interwar years had been to move away from the large conscript armies of the First World War and instead to more technologically advanced and equipped forces. Fortunately for the British Army, the availability of just those types of forces would expand during the same summer months that the LDV was exploding in popularity.

The mobile columns would contain almost all of the armored forces available to the British Army during the summer of 1940 and the exact composition of these forces varied greatly over the months, nearly tripling in number from around 250 in July to over 750 by September. The good news was that all of the tanks that had been produced during those months were the latest and most capable British types, which in some ways made them qualitatively superior to the forces that had been sent to France months before. The greatest expectations were placed on the 1st and 21st Army Tank Brigades which were provided with almost all of the Matilda infantry tanks which were thought to be the strongest counter to German units and equipment. Whether or not these would have been as effective as expected is up in the air, because the home forces suffered from the same doctrinal issues that would cause so much difficulty for the British in the deserts of North Africa in the early years of the war. The problem was that British armor doctrine did not include a combined arms structure, and the infantry and armor were not trained or structured to provide close support to one another. Instead the tanks were supposed to charge ahead in large numbers and push back the enemy before the infantry, following distantly behind arrived to consolidate the object. These tactics simply did not work against the German armored units, who worked closely with German infantry in a way that made any kind of tank only attacks risky at best. These shortcomings in British tactics would take some kind of work themselves out, and several defeats in the desert.

While there should have been some criticism of British armored doctrine Ironside was also getting some criticism from other British leaders, key among them Churchill himself. On June 28th Churchill’s primary concern was that Ironside was trying to defend the entire coast, which was always going to challenging with the available forces. This was not bad advice, it was impossible to defend the beaches everywhere, but Churchill, and others that voiced similar concerns, were not taking into account how difficult it was going to be to quickly move large forces around Britain in time to meet an invasion. The standard British infantry division of 1940 was supposed to be equipped with 2,000 motor vehicles in a variety of types, but there were enough vehicles to go around and while there had been attempts to bolster the transport capabilities of the divisions through civilian cars and trucks, those vehicles were not designed for military transport and few of them had any off road capabilities. This meant that while forces might be able to take advantage of the British rail system to get around, once they were off the trains they were limited to moving at the speed of a walk. Because Ironside lacked the ability to race his forces around the countryside quickly, the only option was to spread them out to meet any possible invasion. Even if the thin crust of beach defenders only bought a day that would be massive when it came to repositioning both the mobile columns and other infantry forces. Ironside knew the beach defenses were too weak, that they would eventually be overwhelmed, that the Germans held all of the advantages when it came to concentrating forces. But the good news was that every single day that the Germans delayed action those positions, defenses, and troops manning them were getting stronger. This made it more and more likely that the defending units would meet their goals to delay and disorganize.

These improvements that were happening throughout the summer reduced some of the problems that British defenders were facing, particularly with the introduction of new equipment due to the efforts of British arms factories. Ironside would not survive in his post to see the greatest fruits of this production though, because in mid July Ironside would be promoted out of the position, given the new rank of Field Marshal and essentially retired. He would be replaced by General Alan Brooke, had had previously commanded troops a Corps of troops in the Field Force that had been sent to France. Brooke had been able to take advantage of his relationship with Churchill to transition into the position from his much less important position as the commander of Southern Force. Brooke came into the position at a good time, because he was going to have tools that, even he would admit, Ironside had not been able to plan on utilizing in the defense because they did not exist. By September Brooke would have hundreds of additional tanks, but almost more importantly the equipment and readiness of all units had been on the rise. Some of this new equipment had come from the United States, with large purchases of military hardware already on the books for both the British and French before May 1940, and then the British taking over almost all of the French orders after their exit from the war. The Americans would continue to be an important part of Churchill’s hopes during this period, even if he always wished for them to be more directly involved. The Isolationists still held sway in Washington, and so there were limits to what could be expected in terms of official actions of the American government. But there would be one thing that the Americans were always interested in, money, and at least during 1940 the British still had money to spend and there were manufacturers ready to take that money and give war material in return. This included a very large series of orders that were placed by the British Purchasing Commission with American firms in May 1940 on all manner of military goods, from personal equipment to tanks and aircraft. British gold reserves were finite though, and it would soon become clear that unless America entered the war or some kind of arrangement was arrived at the British could not maintain access to American industry. Eventually this would result in the Lend Lease program of 1941, but even before that agreement, Roosevelt and the American government were gearing up their economy to massively increase production, with very large armament expansion bills put through congress during the summer of 1940. Later in the year Roosevelt would also give his famous Arsenal of Democracy speech: “They [Britain] ask us for the implements of war, the planes, the tanks, the guns, the freighters which will enable them to fight for their liberty and for our security. Emphatically we must get these weapons to them, get them to them in sufficient volume and quickly enough, so that we and our children will be saved the agony and suffering of war which others have had to endure.”. But at least at the time that he gave that speech, the British were still only given items that they could pay for. That is getting a bit ahead of our story though, and during the 1940, while they were very happy with any material they could get from the United States the British leaders were still going to have to fight off any invasion with what they had available. The good news is that the situation was improving every day, with hundreds of thousands of new military recruits going through training, the re-equipping of the troops that had been evacuated with France, and the continued increase in the production levels from British factories all serving to improve the overall outlook for the British military throughout the summer. And throughout all of this, even though we have spent 2 episodes discussing invasion preparations we have not even really talked about the greatest tool that the British had to prevent an invasion: The Royal Navy. We will address the Senior Service and its plans to meet a German invasion next episode