231: Stumbling to the End

Description

In this episode, we explore the critical second week of September 1940, when the Battle of Britain reached a pivotal turning point that would ultimately determine the fate of Operation Sea Lion—Germany’s planned invasion of Britain. Following the devastating bombing raids on London that began September 7th, German invasion preparations were paradoxically at their peak readiness while simultaneously becoming increasingly uncertain. As the Luftwaffe shifted focus from targeting RAF airfields to bombing London’s civilian and industrial targets, Hitler repeatedly delayed his invasion decision, pushing the operation dangerously late into the season. Meanwhile, Fighter Command adapted brilliantly to the new German tactics, concentrating their forces more effectively and introducing coordinated squadron attacks that would prove devastatingly effective. We’ll examine how weather, tactical missteps, and the growing exhaustion of both German and British pilots set the stage for the climactic confrontation of September 15th—later known as Battle of Britain Day—while exploring the human cost of this aerial campaign on both military personnel and London’s civilian population.

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Summary

Hello everyone and welcome to History of the Second World War Episode 231 - The Battle of Britain Pt. 6 - Stumbling to the End. This week a big thank you goes out to David and Chad for the Donation and to Scott, Luks, Mark, and TheGooseIsLoose for supporting the podcast by becoming members. Members get access to ad-free versions of all of the podcast’s episode plus special member only episodes roughly once a month. Head on over to historyofthesecondworldwar.com/members to find out more. After the flurry of bombing raids that were executed during the first week of September, culminating in the attacks on London on September 7th the plans for the German invasion were in an odd position. On one hand they were as ready as they could ever possibly be with both the army and naval components of the preparations complete, and just waiting on the finalization of the date so that they could begin their 10 days of positioning and final preparations. But it was unclear if the Luftwaffe had yet completed its goal of decisively reducing the RAF’s combat abilities, and if it even could accomplish that goal given the time remaining, which by September 7th was just a few days . To make the waters even muddier, the emerging emphasis on bombing of London and related civilian and industrial targets made it unclear if they were still even pursuing the goal of preparing for the invasion. Bombing the London East End, while perhaps an important part of reducing the flow of sea based goods into the capital did basically nothing to help to prepare for an invasion. On September 9th the Luftwaffe leadership would just make things worse by fully endorsing consistent day and night bombing raids on London. An interesting entry from the diary of the Naval Operations Staff would have this to say about the Naval view of the current state of the campaign: “[T]he air campaign is being conducted specifically as an air offensive without regard for the current requirements of naval warfare … the fact therefore remains that chances for the execution of the landing operations have remained uninfluenced by the effects of the intensified air offensive …”. To the British leaders it appeared that the preparations for an invasion were continuing, with clear indications that the concentration of transport and landing craft along the coasts had been mostly completed by September 7th. These reconnaissance reports were supported by Enigma decrypts which pointed to final training exercises for the landing occurring among German ground formations. The risk of a possible landing was considered to be great that on September 7th the code word was sent out that anti-invasion forces should be put on the highest possible alert for the next two weeks due to the fact that the invasion could occur at any time. The code word was Cromwell, and if you want the background on that codeword, I highly recommend the last few months of the Pax Britannica podcast. The importance of this order when looking back at history is to emphasize the the British really did think an invasion was likely, and they were preparing for it to occur. How likely was it to actually occur? Well that varied on a day to day basis due to the events that would occur during the second week of September.

The Luftwaffe would be hampered during this week by the return of their undefeated adversary, the weather, which would reduce the ability of the German formations to complete their raids and sometimes to even find their targets. In attempts to launch another raid against London’s East End on September 8th, of the German bombers that were dispatched only 5 would actually dropped their bombs on the capital due to weather conditions. Night time raids would be more successful. On the 9th things would be quite a bit different, with a large raid of almost 100 bombers moving in on London, even though the weather was not perfect. In this case they would be met by a strong response by Fighter Command, with 11 squadrons bring brought in to meet the raid, shooting down several bombers. The consequence of these raids, and their overall disappointing results, meant that Hitler would delay his invasion decision, which was supposed to occur on September 10th to instead be on September 14th. This would already push the date for the invasion to the 24th, dangerously late, and it would result in all of the invasion barges and boats stuck in their harbors for additional time, a risky proposition when both RAF Bomber Command and the Royal Navy were already launching sporadic attacks against them. After 4 days of operations Fighter Command was also beginning to adjust to the new format of Luftwaffe operations. For the preceding weeks the Luftwaffe had been structuring their operations so that there were a large number of smaller raids which focused on multiple targets every day. The new operational procedures seemed to be that they would remain as one large group of aircraft and focus on one specific set of closely grouped targets. This change completely altered how Fighter Command could react to the raids, because previously the need to meet widely divergent raids spread Fighter command squadrons out in ways that were quite inefficient. But now they could be almost completely concentrated on one area, which made it much simpler to organize and also allowed for the British fighters to form up in larger groups before making their attacks, which would make them even more effective. This change would be sent out on September 11th, and moving forward 11 Group’s fighter squadrons would attack in pairs, instead of by themselves as they had before. When possible Spitfires would also be more specifically dedicated to meeting with the German fighters were Hurricanes focused on the bombers, which had always been the basic concept but had not always been possible because it was not always possible for squadrons of each of the fighter types to be present to meet the earlier raids.

September 11th would be another busy day, during which Fighter Command would have the opportunity to try out its new more structured and prepared attacks. On the day another 100 bomber raid with large numbers of escorting fighters would make their way in for an attack on London’s East End docks. They would be met by a succession of squadron, first by 4 squadrons of 11 group, then 3 more of 11 group, and then finally 4 squadrons from 12 Group, all of which were equipped with Spitfires. 12 Group, under the command of Vice Air Marshall Leigh-Mallory organized its squadrons slightly different than Park’s 11 Group. Leigh-Mallory had come to the conclusion that the dual squadron attacks, or even the three squadron attacks were just too small and that if the fighters wanted to be more effective they needed to organize into larger groups before they met the German raiders. Leigh-Mallory believed that five squadrons was the proper number, a collection he referred to as a Big Wing. There were benefits and downsides to this approach, obviously more British fighters made it harder for the German fighters to properly shield the bombers from them. But at the same time, bigger wings were slower to assemble and this made it more likely that they would not reach the bombers before they were able to drop their bombs. Park and Leigh-Mallory would have two very different views on the correct course of action, and what would begin as mild disagreements would turn into a major series of arguments later in the year. Regardless of exactly how many squadrons were collected before they moved into the attack the British fighters were still outnumbered, and they could not prevent the German bombers from each their targets, but they would be able to shoot down several German bombers and Bf-110s in their efforts. A greater cost was paid by the German groups as they tried to return to their bases with multiple squadrons including the Royal Canadian Air Force squadron making their attacks . This would result in 7 bombers and 2 more Bf-110s being destroyed. In total 10 bombers, 7 Bf-110s and 5 109s would all be destroyed, which meant that 10% of the bombers would not return, a heavy price to pay . Undeterred, Luftwaffe planners began planning for an even larger raid that was supposed to take place on the 13th, which would involve a maximum effort by Kesselring’s Luftflotte. But this raid had to be delayed due to weather so that it could not occur until the 14th. This delay then caused Hitler to once again delay his decision on Sea Lion to September 17th, which again pushed the invasion date even further. These constant delays would be the point where Sea Lion would start to be impossible, although we will save a deeper discussion on that for a few episodes when we can look at the entire series of events in a more focused conversation.

During the period between September 12 and 14th, while the Luftwaffe was waiting for a good weather day to launch their major attack, which they had given the codename Valhalla, other smaller raids would continue on a variety of targets. The largest raids would continue to be on London and the surrounding districts, although there would also be some very small raids on airfields and other targets. Over London Fighter Command squadrons would continue to try and meet the German bomber forces with the maximum possible response, which often meant launching as many as 20 total Fighter Command squadrons against a raid, even though it rarely resulted in every one of the squadrons actually making contact with the bombing raid. This would often occur if the raid was smaller than expected, or if there were no bombers at all, with the goal of cycling the Fighter Squadrons as quickly as possible in case of further raids. More bombs were dropped during these raids, but they did not result in significant damage. Some of the smallest raids would see just a handful, and sometimes only 1, of German bombers attack airfields. These small efforts were often just completely ignored by Fighter Command. The days between the 12th and 14th were important for Fighter Command because it represented two days of relatively light activity, which gave them time to rest, more than they had since the start of August, and really you might be able to go all the way back to the beginning of July to find days that were as easy and restful as September 12 and 13th. This would leave them in a very good position to meet the Valhalla attack, that was eventually rescheduled to the 15th.

While the battle may have been working out pretty well for the pilots of Fighter Command, the citizens of London were not having a good time after September 7th. Modern cities are a massive collection of intricate systems that, when disrupted, can cause all kinds of issues. For example on September 10th a German bomb would fall on northern London and damage the northern outfall sewer. This was the route through which much of London’s sewage ran out of the city and the bomb caused a containment breach which allowed sewage to run into the River Lea. The result was some very bad smells over the route of the river, and this type of damage was so bad that it would be discussed on the 13th among the War Cabinet. The result was that nothing could really be done until the damage was repaired and that would take months. Another major issue that was faced not so much by London itself but by the surrounding communities was the fact that large number of the residents of the East End would pack up and move as soon as the bombing started. They would spread in many different directions causing serious problems for other areas of London and for the towns of Reading, Windsor, and Oxford which suddenly had to try to accommodate thousands of new refugees, who often brought with them very little money. Back in London the bombing would also cause major crowding in some of the bomb shelters, particularly in basements of churches, schools, and public buildings which had been converted to bomb shelters but suddenly found themselves overwhelmed by the numbers of individuals trying to utilize the space. Anytime large numbers of individuals crowded together concerns about the spread of infectious diseases would follow. This point, in mid September would also be the start of the conversations about using the Tube stations as bomb shelters, which would become a much more pressing topic throughout the Blitz. At least initially there was major resistance to the idea that a bunch of people should be packed into the Tube stations due to the concern that it would disrupt traffic, and that is where the matter stood at least for awhile. it would be far from the last time that the topic would be revisited, and eventually the people of London would take the matter into their own hands. It would turn out to be difficult to keep people out of publicly available underground concrete structures when they feared aerial bombardment.

In the first half of September, if you take all of the Luftwaffe’s various strategy and tactical changes, the changes in focus for the campaign, and then the discussions that were occurring among the leaders and pilots the story that you arrive at is a military arm that was in some ways flailing in an attempt to meet its goals . There are a variety of examples that could be considered in this analysis, but I am just going to focus on two: the transition of more Bf-109s into a Fighter Bomber role and the switch over to a focus on the bombing of the industrial and civilian targets in London. Episode 226 introduced the new force of Bf-109s that had been converted into a group of dedicated fighter bombers under the theory that they would be able to better survive their bombing operations through the speed that they possessed. Throughout the first weeks of the Battle of Britain they would be in constant action, attacking various targets with their low level high speed attacks that had reasonable accuracy. As the losses to the medium bomber groups mounted over the course of the campaign, more Bf-109 squadrons would be converted into dedicated fighter bomber groups. This was not completely bad in and of itself, the 109 had proved to be capable of getting the job done, but it was also not a great use of resources on the German side. The biggest problem was that, while their bomb for bomb accuracy was perhaps a bit better than the German medium bombers, their carrying capacity was far lower. This meant that they just were not equipped to attack anything beyond very small very specific targets, but during September and October they would begin to be used against targets in London. Importantly, there was far more involved in expanding the number of 109 bombers than just converting some aircraft, because of the major reasons that the first groups were so successful is because the pilots had been handpicked and had went through extensive training. It was only through this experience that they were able to maintain their high bombing accuracy. As the numbers expanded, more pilots of lesser skill were brought in and they were provided with less training, which meant a higher percentage of bombs were being dropped off target. It did not help that when bombing population centers like London the 109s had to fly higher than they wanted to due to the volume of anti-aircraft fire . All of this is before even considering the fact that the 109 fighter squadrons were already being pushed to the limits of their endurance to meet the demands of bomber escort missions and suddenly there were hundreds less 109s available for bomber protection. The second major change made by the Luftwaffe that we have already discussed was the change over from the very targeted strikes on RAF targets to more general and at times civilian targets in and around London. This change gets a lot of criticism in the histories, but also would have gotten a lot of criticism from the pre-war German Luftwaffe. In the years before the war the Luftwaffe had specifically dismissed the idea of terror bombing cities because, at the time, they believed that the results were both not predictable . At the time they were concerned about exactly what would happen in London over the course of the Blitz, instead of the destruction of civilian morale the bombing raids served as a unifying event, and one that hardened the resolve of some to continue the fight. It also did not drastically derail the war time activities of the city. However, when the decision was put before Goering, Hitler, and other German leaders they specifically ignored their prewar ideas and conclusions .

While the German leaders were shifting how the bombing campaign was being organized, in big and small ways, at the front, the German pilots were wearing down. On the bomber side, as losses grew morale dropped, as so often happened with any military unit. This was compounded by the fact that, unlike the Allied bombing campaigns of later year, there was no real concept of a tour of duty for the Luftwaffe at this point in the war. For example one bomber pilot, Hajo Herrmann, would fly 90 combat missions between the start of the war and the middle of October, with almost a third of those flown just against London in September and October. The feelings among the fighter pilots were more complicated . The same level of exhaustion was there, both from the number of sorties that were being flown as well as the losses . As one Pilot, Ulrich Steinhilper, would write that the exhaustion ‘comes with living under constant threat. […] We would feel the relief of returning to base, but would then have to cope with the emotions of having lost friends and colleagues, knowing also that within minutes we would have to do it all again.’. This was compounded by the fact that many fighter pilots knew that their own performance was being hindered, and their risk of death was being increased, by the need to provide close support to the bombers. They knew that having to fly lower and slower to protect the bombers was costing the fighter groups both aircraft and pilots, but they were being forced to do so to try and reduce bomber losses. It seemed clear which group of pilots were being favored by Luftwaffe tactics, and it did not seem to be the pilots in their 109s. All of these challenges compounded to crush morale with a variety of effects. There were also a rise in the number of instances of German fighters turning around from their missions claiming some sort of vague mechanical issue with their aircraft, engine issues were common. However, upon landing no issues were found. And this was not just happening to new pilots, but also far more experienced veterans, even those that had been flying since the Spanish Civil War days. When noting one of these instances Ulrich would chalk it up primarily to the tempo of operations “It seemed you could just wear out like any other machine. And that is where things were going wrong; we just weren’t getting a break.”. As morale fell, the number of complaints and other issues increased, particularly as the campaign which was supposed to be a quick easy win instead transitioned into a long slog that was not clearly progressing in favor of the Luftwaffe.

Even the British pilots were feeling the strain of long term combat operations by the middle of September, and they in some ways had it easier than the German pilots. On a positive side for the Fighter Command pilots, they were at least not operating constantly on the very edge of their operational range like the 109 pilots, and they were not constantly burning time and energy flying across the channel from France. The downsides for the British pilots was that they did not know exactly when a raid was going to happen, which resulted in long periods of waiting and low level anxiety in anticipation of the next order to scramble to meet an incoming German formation. As Bee Beamont would say “There was a lot of tension in sitting around in dispersal, you jumped a foot when the telephone went. […] Fighting was tiring, It was all cumulative. The weeks went by and the pressure never stopped, and then there was the loss of your colleagues.”. But there would still be times when the pilots could unwind, a critical part of maintaining combat readiness over weeks and months, Bee would go on to say “If you’d been fighting during the day and you’d gone off down the pub with the lads at night and then had a little bit more than you should have, by four o’clock in the morning when you were woken you probably had a bit of a hangover and so as soon as you got to dispersal you’d find a bed and lie down and go to sleep till somebody woke you up.”. Obviously getting completely drunk, and still being drunk while going down the runway for take off was not optimal, but dwelling on the stress and anxiety had its own issues. Experience was also important, and the worst loss rates were always among the newest pilots. Veteran pilots like Pete Brothers, would claim that much of this was down to simply knowing the aircraft in a more intimate way and not having to really think about what the aircraft could or should do when under attack, and instead just doing it. The growing number of inexperienced pilots on both sides would be a problem during the later stages of the fighting September, as the rate at which new blood entered into the fighting would outpace the rate at which those same pilots were gaining the needed experience, which just put more pressure on the experienced pilots, and ever so exhausted, pilots to take up the slack. Limited aircraft made this worse, because if their was a mechanical issue with an Spitfire, Hurricane, or 109, it was not the veteran pilots that would stay behind, it was the newest, and those extra sorties added up. But all of these problems, the exhaustion, the anxiety, would not prevent operation Valhalla, which was now scheduled for September 15th, which would go on to be known as Battle of Britain day