234: Big Wings, Big Egos

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By the end of September 1940, the threat of German invasion had passed, but victory in the Battle of Britain sparked a bitter internal conflict within RAF Fighter Command. Air Vice-Marshal Keith Park of 11 Group, who had successfully defended southeastern England using small, quick-response fighter formations, found himself under attack from Air Vice-Marshal Leigh-Mallory of 12 Group, who advocated for “Big Wing” tactics—concentrating multiple squadrons into large formations. This strategic disagreement, fueled by inflated victory claims and personal ambitions, ultimately led to the removal of both Hugh Dowding, head of Fighter Command, and Park himself in late 1940. Despite their crucial roles in Britain’s survival during the summer of 1940, these architects of victory were cast aside just as the threat they had defeated was transforming into the night bombing campaign of the Blitz.

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Summary

Hello everyone and welcome to History of the Second World War Episode 234: After the Battle of Britain Pt. 2 - Big Wings, Big Egos. This week a big thank you goes out to Sam and Bob for supporting the podcast by becoming members. Members get access to ad-free versions of all of the podcast’s episode plus special member only episodes roughly once a month. Head on over to historyofthesecondworldwar.com/members to find out more. By the end of September the greatest danger of an invasion appeared to be over. Anyone in Britain knew that the daylight raids that had been a fixture of life in southeast England were no longer happening, and while the night time bombing continued there were already triumphant stories of victory in the newspaper. Among British leaders, they had better intelligence than what was available to the press and from that perspective it was even more apparent that the German invasion preparations that had been underway for the last several months were being undone. Barges and ships were dispersing, ground forces were being repositioned, decrypted messages were orders for the movement of troops for other duties, all the hallmarks that the invasion was postponed until at least the spring of 1941. The focus of Luftwaffe operations would be on night bombing for the following months, and that meant a reprieve for the pilots and ground crew of Fighter Command which had bore the brunt of the fighting since August. Even though Fighter Command had accomplished its goal of surviving the Luftwaffe onslaught there were disagreements within the leadership about why that success had been achieved and how it might have been achieved earlier. Starting in roughly mid August there was a major disagreement between Park, the leader of 11 Group, and Leigh-Mallory, the head of 12 Group about the best way to meet German raids and to defeat them. That disagreement would spiral out into infighting that would last until Leigh-Mallory would replace Park as head of 11 Group in December 1940. And not to spoil the episode too much, but if you happen to be a big Leigh-Mallory supporter this episode may not be your favorite.

The debates between Leigh-Mallory, Park, and the head of Fighter Command Dowding were at least outwardly rooted in disagreements about the effectiveness of how British fighter squadrons should be organized. This required some kind of evaluation of how the current structure was performing and then comparisons to a different system. Trying to complete these comparisons during the height of a major air campaign ran into a few major issues that are worth reviewing before we dive into how the debates occurred and their outcomes. The first issue was that the Germans were changing their tactics all the time, maybe not in major ways, but in small ways the structure of German raids and the behavior of their fighter escorts were changing even if sometimes those changes were as small as the high escort moving 5,000 feet higher or more fighters being dedicated to close support. These constant small changes meant that the British had to constantly slightly change their own methods in response. The bigger issue though, and one this podcast has discussed constantly, although from the German perspective, was the issue of understanding the outcome of any given aerial engagement. The Luftwaffe pilots were not the only ones that were overcounting their victories against the enemy, and within Spitfire and Hurricane squadrons there was just as much double, triple, or even higher multiples of counting . This was a critical factor in the debates between Park and Leigh-Mallory because at the core of Leigh-Mallory’s idea was that a larger number of fighters should be attacking the bombing raids together. But the more aircraft that were involved the greater the chance that the enemy losses that were reported would be greatly exaggerated. As was seen in some of the major raids on London in mid-September, the chaos just got out of control when 2,3, or 5 squadrons of British fighters all dove in on the German aircraft simultaneously. There was simply too much happening for pilots to keep track of, and this resulted in damaged aircraft being attacked multiple times and claimed multiple times. This caused issues with how various tactics could be evaluated, or to quote Niall MacKay and Christopher Price from Safety in Numbers: Ideas of Concentration in Royal Air Force Fighter Defence from Lanchester to the Battle of Britain “The issue of force concentration in the Battle of Britain provides a case study in the problems of translating military theory into battlefield practice. The aim of models, theory and ‘principles’ is to approach underlying truth through clarity of thought: when through either misuse or diffusion this clarity is lost, they risk rather obscuring the truth.”.

Air Vice-Marshal Park, with the full support of Air Chief Dowding, had a very specific idea of how to best meet the German raids that were occurring during the Battle of Britain, particularly in the beginning when the Germans were generally launching many smaller raids throughout the day. The basic idea is that every raid should be met by something, whether that was 1 squadron or multiple, each one should be defended against, and they should be hit as early and often. This was a challenge in some cases due to how close the targets were to the coast, because this meant that the RAF Squadrons did not have any time to concentrate or wait for anybody else they simply had to dive into the fight as soon as possible otherwise they would miss their opportunity. This strategy brought with it some major downsides, the most important of which was that it meant that the RAF fighters would always be at a numerical disadvantage . They would always be facing a greater number of German fighters and bombers, and they would just have to deal with that problem. This did not always mean that they were all wiped from the sky, aerial combat during the Second World War did not always work like that, but it did mean that in some cases they were unable to get to the bombers or were unable to damage many enemy aircraft. Another issue with this strategy is that it went against the general military guidance of concentration, and instead of truly stopping one German bombing raid out of several, 11 Group was spreading out their strength and merely annoying many of the raids. There were benefits to this strategy though, and it was these benefits that Park and Dowding would emphasize when supporting their ideas and decisions. The most important benefit is that it provided maximum disruption on as many raids as possible, with the hope that even minimal fighter defenses resulting in more bombs falling off target. The goal was to allow no raids to drop their bombs without being harassed in some way by fighters and they largely achieve that goal, with a few exceptions where mistakes were made in intercept positioning. 11 Groups tactics also made it very difficult for the Germans to really understand the strength of RAF Fighter Command because they were constantly only seeing tiny portions of it committed against a raid at any given time. This would play into the German continued underestimation of Fighter Command strength, with those evaluations made even more challenging due to how the RAF was moving around squadrons throughout the battle. This ties into another area of disagreement between 11 Group and 12 Group. Core to Dowding’s beliefs on how to fight the Battle of Britain was the idea that 11 Group should always be kept as strong as possible, through the rotation of squadrons in and out of 11 Group as they were worn down and needed to be replaced. This served two major purposes, it would give Park and 11 Group the greatest strength with which to defend the pivotal areas of southeast England, while also obscuring from the Germans the true state of Fighter Command. Or to quote from a meeting at Fighter Command Headquarters on September 7th: “The C-in-C [Dowding] stressed the fact that it was absolutely essential that the enemy should not become aware that he had materially damaged us; it was imperative that an undiminished front exist in the South East, because the enemy was undoubtedly feeling the strain very much at the same time, and nothing should be afforded them in the nature of encouragement…It was absolutely essential that the enemy should be made to believe that our strength was in no way diminished. No. 11 Group must have the best of everything, and go on fighting until, in necessary, everything had been used up”. The exact impact that this had on German understanding of RAF strength is obfuscated by all the mistakes they were making in estimations of that strength in general, but Dowding did not know of those mistakes at the time. One of the important impact that this emphasis on 11 Group had was that it made very , very clear to everyone which group was the most important, and it sure was not 12 Group, something that seems to have rankled Leigh-Mallory who clearly was not pleased to be playing second fiddle.

Beyond perhaps some issues with where Fighter Command emphasis was being placed, there were real disagreements between 12 and 11 Group about the best way to defeat the Germans. Leigh-Mallory and one of his Squadron Leaders Douglas Bader firmly believed that Park’s strategy of meeting raids with small numbers of fighters was wasteful both in terms of losses and effort. Instead they favored the opposite approach and instead of trying to meet every raid with a small force they believed that instead fighter squadrons should be concentrated in what they called a Big Wing, of 4 or more squadrons and then all together they should descend on German formations. This did have very clear benefits, that were impossible to deny, by meeting a raid with a larger number of fighters it was much more likely that the German fighter escorts would be overwhelmed, with would allow the British fighters the freedom to attack the bombers . This would, theoretically, result in more bombers being shot down which was the entire goal of Fighter Command, to shoot down as many bombers as possible. It was also hoped that this would result in fewer damaged and destroyed Spitfires and Hurricanes because they would not be entering into combat at a disadvantage. But there were issues, which Leigh-Mallory would of course downplay and Park would of course emphasize. The biggest issue was that assembling squadrons into one formation took time, it was a simple math problem around how many aircraft could take off from one airfield at one time or from multiple airfields and then meet up in the air. The first planes off the ground would have to loiter until everyone was in the air and only then could they fly off to their target. This resulted in a slower response to notice of a German raid, which for 12 Group was not as much of a concern because they were not being asked to meet the German raids that were targeting areas close to the coast. But Park felt that his squadrons could simply never waste time waiting in the air. The greater time required to gather up also would reduce the number of sorties that a given squadron could do in a single day. In some cases 11 Group squadrons were going up 4 times in a single day, and that simply was not possible if they spent extra time in the air waiting for others. But in many ways 12 Group also was not working under these same issues, because their position further from some of the German raids meant that they were not launching as many sorties as often anyway because it took them longer to get to and from the fighting. I am emphasizing the differences here because in retrospect one of the most interesting aspects of the Big Wing debate was the fact that if you take the personalities and politics out of the equation you are left with the simple fact that two different commanders were working under two very different set of constraints. 12 Group did not have to worry about its airfields being bombed or the challenges involved in meeting another raid immediately after because they had distance and space. 11 Group had none of that freedom. If you want to give Leigh-Mallory the benefit of the doubt, and you want to be as favorable as possible to his viewpoint, you are still left with the fact that he clearly either dismissed or did not grasp the challenges faced by 11 Group. It is, at the very least, a clear case of a military officer that had ideas about how to do something and when somebody else acted differently immediately made the assumption that they were doing things wrong without any consideration for what might be forcing them into those decisions. I am not convinced that Leigh-Mallory’s attack on Park was rooted in such a simple mistake though.

While the disagreements between Park and Leigh-Mallory would simmer for most of August and throughout early September they would really only come a head, oddly enough, after the threat of a German invasion had passed. The cause for the disagreements boiling over was a report that was published by Leigh-Mallory in the wake of the major German bombing raids over London during the second week of September. These were covered a few episodes ago, but they were the raids which were met by absolute swarms of British fighters from both 11 and 12 Group. The general structure was that 11 Group met them with 2 and sometimes 3 squadron groups as they approached London and then 12 Group would arrive with a Big Wing of at least 5 squadrons once they were over London. To summarize Leigh-Mallory’s conclusions in his report, basically the Big Wing from 12 Group had won a great victory over London due to its arrival in great number. This report then made it around the important circles in London, which would shape the thoughts and debate over the following months. There were problems with this report though, the most important being the greatly inflated numbers that it presented due to the challenges of estimating the victories when so many fighters were involved. Leigh-Mallory, presented the numbers reported from his pilots without the caveats and context that they probably needed, and Park took great offense to this. The squadrons of 11 Group had been fighting for its life for months, had launched far more fighters at the German raids of London, and yet 12 Group was somehow claiming some kind of prime role in the victory, and with inflated numbers. Dowding, while he had supported Park’s tactics, would also at least move into support of the Big Wing idea in late September and early October, if only due to the political pressure being placed on Fighter command due to the support for Leigh-Mallory that had been generated by the report.

Park would answer with a report that this was simply impossible for 11 Group to do, assuming that the goal was to engage German bombers before they reached their targets, and it had been even more impossible over the months of fighting because it was essential that they be met before they dropped bombs on 11 Group airfields. In this report he included track charts which made it clear that if he waited for larger formations interceptions would be almost impossible. He also made it clear that one of the problems that 11 Group faced that 12 group did not was the many patrols that was asked of his fighters, with squadrons being in the air constantly to meet German raids instead of just waiting prepped on the ground waiting for the call. Park would then also try and get his views read at the Air Ministry with another report that outlined what he had been trying to do and why. The disagreements between the group leaders would culminate in a meeting on October 17, 1940. The meeting was essentially an attack on Park, his leadership, and his decision making. Both Leigh-Mallory and Bader would be present and the minutes of the meeting make it clear that Park was simply on the defensive the entire time constantly having to justify what he had done. Dowding seems to have not come to the defense of Park in the way that might have been expected given his previous support for Park.

It is worth nothing that Bader was the only pilot or squadron leader present at the meeting, and no first had testimony from any 11 Group pilot was sought. This was important because, as would become clear in the weeks that followed, one of the important parts of Leigh-Mallory and Bader’s argument was that they claimed that 11 Group morale was sapped by Park constantly sending them into battle outnumbered. While the number issue can be seen mentioned in many 11 Group accounts, there is little indication that morale was was a problem within 11 Group. In fact, Park’s accounts had many things to say about the morale of 12 Group’s squadrons that were transferred to him throughout the battle, with concerns that they had been told that it was only save to engage the enemy when in large formations which was not always possible. While the meeting on October 17th was important, Park would not be removed from command immediately. It was clear by the end of October that he was on his way out though, 12 Group headquarters became a popular place to visit by members of the War Cabinet, who were filled with the ideas of Bader and the Big Wing. Park, for his part, would begin Big Wing operations during the second half of October but the results for 11 Group would be disappointing, with it being put into action 10 times but only recording a single downed enemy. This would be outlined in a report by Park to Dowding in early November, which was circulated like the previous reports, but it made not difference. The criticism of Park would also trickle up to Dowding as well, with him being removed from the command of Fighter Command on November 25. This final message would all of the operational squadrons of Fighter command would read: “My dear Fighter Boys, In sending you this my last message, I wish I could say all that is in my heart. I cannot hope to surpass the simple eloquence of the Prime Minister’s words, ‘Never before has so much been owed by so many to so few.’ The debt remains and will increase. In saying good bye to you I want you to know how continually you have been in my thoughts, and that, though our direct communication may be severed, I may yet be able to help you in your gallant fight.. Good bye to you and God bless you all.”. Dowding would represent British interests in America for awhile before retiring in 1942, being elevated to a Barony in 1943 and choosing the title The Lord Dowding of Bentley Priory, with Bentley Priory being the location of the headquarters of Fighter Command during the Battle of Britain. Churchill would write years later that: “The foresight of Air Marshal Dowding in his direction of Fighter Command deserves high praise, and even more remarkable had been the restraint and the exact measurement of formidable stresses which had reserved a fighter force in the North through all these long weeks of mortal conflict in the South. We must regard the generalship here shown as an example of genius in the art of war.”. Park would hold on a little longer, being made a member of the Order of the Bath in early December before being replaced by Leigh-Mallory on December 18th. Park would be moved to Training Command before taking a posting in Egypt and then Malta. This means that this will not be the last time Park will appear on the podcast and he would play a major role in defending against another major Luftwaffe offensive in the skies over Malta in 1942.

It is interesting to look back on the disagreements between Leigh-Mallory, Bader, Park, Dowding, and others within the upper reaches of RAF Fighter Command because it is clear to us now that they were arguing in the afterglow of their greatest victory. The Royal Air Force would go on to play a crucial role in the British war effort for the rest of the war, roughly 4 and a half years of warfare after Battle of Britain day, but never again would it be the focus of the entire war like it was between June and September 1940. The Luftwaffe had one singular goal throughout the summer months of 1940, destroy RAF Fighter Command, and Fighter Command had one single goal survive, and they had survived. The list of reasons that they survived is long and broad, with so many decisions, actions, and people taking part not just in 1940 but for years before the war even started. But two of the people that had been critical to those preparations, who had made many of those decisions, who had taken many of those actions at some of the most stressful moments imaginable were Hugh Dowding and Keith Park. Respectively they had commanded the two most important positions in the entire Royal Air Force, some might say the entire British War Effort during the summer of 1940. Dowding commanded Fighter Command and had been the person most responsible for the preparations and organizations that had been done before the war. He had supported the creation of Chain Home, had taken the steps to make sure that radar information got to squadrons fast enough to react, supported the projects that had put Hurricanes and Spitfires in the air, and organized Fighter Command in a way that allowed it to meet its greatest challenge. Park had commanded 11 Group which encompassed the area that was guaranteed the most crucial to the entire campaign. The Luftwaffe had done its best to destroy his entire command, and yet it had survived, with Park making the correct and sometimes the only decisions at crucial moments that allowed the best possible response to German actions, even if the best possible still meant non-optimal. Even though The Few would become the famous heroes of the Battle of Britain, the pilots always get the most glory, the Battle of Britain was won by thousands of people all over Britain, and two of those men were Dowding and Park. And in the aftermath of that great victory, when they had saved Britain from a German invasion, they were cast aside. Those who replaced them had their reasons for wanting them gone, I think they are rubbish but obviously some thought they had merit. And as fate would have it, they were replaced at the moment where the arguments and disagreements that their dismissal was built around no longer mattered. By the end of November the Luftwaffe fighter and bombers would never again truly threaten the daylight skies of Britain, that was in the past. Instead there was a new threat, a threat that required completely different technology and tactics to defeat. Night after night of bombing raids, the Blitz was in full swing